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Wilkinson (2021) argues that the use of frailty scores in ICU triage does not necessarily 
involve discrimination on the basis of disability. In support of this argument, he claims, “it is not 
the disability per se that the score is measuring – rather it is the underlying physiological and 
physical vulnerability” (x). While we appreciate the attention Wilkinson explicitly pays to 
disability in this piece, we find the distinction between disability and underlying vulnerability 
untenable both theoretically and practically. We begin with a brief overview of research in 
philosophy of disability concerning the meaning of the concept itself. We argue that this research 
demonstrates that many forms of disability do not involve underlying vulnerabilities, and, 
furthermore, that Wilkinson equivocates between "disability" understood as a medical category 
vs. "disability" understood as a feature of lived experience. We reject Wilkinson’s distinction on 
these grounds and offer further considerations to avoid disability discrimination in emergency 
and crisis standards of care contexts. 
I. Contemporary Research on the Concept of Disability 
Over the last thirty years, our understanding of the philosophy of disability has grown 
exponentially (Cureton and Wasserman 2020). Elizabeth Barnes’ 2016 book The Minority Body 
marked a watershed moment by placing a decisive nail in the coffin of bad difference views of 
disability. Bad difference views hold that disability is by itself (a) something that makes one 
worse off; and (b) would still be “bad” even if society was fully accommodating of disabled 
people (Barnes 2016, 50). She instead defends a mere difference view of disability on which 
“having a disability is something that makes you different, but not something that by itself makes 
you worse off because of that difference” (Idem, 78, our italics). This does not mean that certain 
disabilities cannot engender negative consequences; on the contrary, that is certainly true. Her 
claim is instead about the prudential effect of disability on a person taken as a whole. Since the 
book’s release, the field has considered and deliberated upon Barnes’ arguments. Tellingly, the 
bad difference view of disability has continued to be broadly rejected, but there remains 
significant disagreement about the mere difference view. Barnes purposely limits her account to 
physical disabilities, and, unsurprisingly, most find it far less fitting as an account of many 
psychological disabilities. Others argue that conditions such as chronic pain challenge the mere-
difference view on its own terms and are exceptions that should instead be understood as bad 
difference forms of disability (Campbell and Stramondo 2017).  
II. The Lived Experiences of Disability 
We will not take a side in this debate here. We have instead cursorily summarized the last 
five-plus years of work in this area in order to make a very simple point: one cannot simply refer 
to “disability per se” as if that picks out some uncontroversial set of features of the world without 
engaging in scholarly debates over the concept of disability itself. What “disability per se” means 
on a bad difference view is different in theoretically and practically decisive ways than what 
“disability per se” means on a mere difference view and so on for other views, mutatis mutandis. 
Furthermore, even within a specific disability or impairment category, which view is most 
appropriate can be contested.  
For example, consider deafness. Accommodations for hearing impairment comprise a large 
subset of expenses incurred through the Americans with Disabilities Act. Effective hearing 
rehabilitative technology and services are also available for many deaf/hard of hearing 
individuals. However, a subset of individuals with profound hearing loss instead embrace a Deaf 
culture based upon sign language as a valued aspect of their lived experience and social identity 
(Bauman 2014). The fact that Wilkinson’s model cannot distinguish between deafness and 
Deafness (capital D) is a considerable flaw (see Mauldin 2016).  
 
III. The Mistake of Applying the “Frailty Phenotype” to Disabled People 
 
Wilkinson might respond that this distinction is irrelevant because both fall under his stipulated 
exception of “stable, long-standing disability.” But that qualification does not get us as far as 
Wilkinson supposes. Consider a patient with Trisomy 21. In a significant portion of cases, the 
“stable” nature of Down syndrome correlates to the presence of underlying, “non-stable” 
disabilities (as Wilkinson deploys the term), namely, cardiovascular pathophysiology. (Current 
statistics confirm a shorter-than-average median lifespan for people with Down syndrome related 
to complex physiologic and social factors (Kaposy 2018)). What frailty scores are meant to 
measure is where a patient falls on the continuum of progressive decline. Another way of looking 
at frailty scores is as an approach to determine “salvageability” or “recoverability.” For a person 
with a physical or cognitive disability, their disability may be neither stable, nor immediately 
progressive. A frailty score would make an assessment at one point in time but would not 
accurately capture the individual’s potential to recover, or disease state across a dynamic 
continuum. In that way it would be not only an inaccurate predictor but also unjust in attempting 
to apply a static system that unfairly discriminates (cf. United Nations 2020). We would take 
issue if one were to suggest that frailty scores as applied to one with Down syndrome are not 
discriminatory because they are not tracking the “disability per se” but instead an underlying 
cardiovascular vulnerability. To treat patients with Down syndrome differently than patients 
without Down syndrome by virtue of the fact they have Down syndrome is, in our view, patent 
discrimination on the basis of disability. In short, attempting to split out “physiological and 
physical vulnerability” from “disability” does not solve the problem. 
Next, it is worth considering the distinction between “vulnerability” and “frailty.” While 
Wilkinson uses the former as a way to explain the latter, we do not see how these concepts are in 
fact different. This raises a deeper issue. While Wilkinson concludes by arguing that “the 
concept of frailty is conceptually clear and measurable,” we remain unconvinced. In practice, 
“frailty” has a predictive function; more specifically, it is thought to predict risks concerning 
various adverse outcomes and events, including morbidity and mortality. Yet, our current 
abilities to engage in prediction and risk assessment beyond a few months are notoriously 
deficient, and the definition of frailty itself relies on multivariate models that integrate 
heterogeneous and ever-changing covariates. Predictive ability is especially problematic when a 
progressive model is applied to a person whose physical or cognitive manifestation of disability 
may wax and wane. As Solomon et al. argued during the heat of debates concerning how to deal 
with COVID-19-related crisis standards of care, “the ability to predict long-term survival is poor 
and therefore susceptible to bias. Furthermore, many disadvantaged populations have reduced 
life expectancy, and triage protocols should not exacerbate health inequities. [Only n]ear-term 
survivability [1-12 months]…can be assessed independently from disability” (Solomon, Wynia, 
and Gostin 2020, e27[2]).  
Despite attempts to achieve standardization, frailty scores are often observer-dependent and 
therefore subject to bias. Similar to clinician bias in assessing a similar comorbidity as more 
severe based on race, a given measure may be viewed differently in a person with a disability as 
opposed to one without. Although a patient using an assistive device may be able to travel the 
same distance as someone without an assistive device, it may take the person with the device 
longer and require more exertion and effort to travel the same distance. Based on this, an 
observer may (misguidedly) view the person with an assistive device as more fragile based on 
biased perceptions of physiological and physical vulnerability. Frailty measures are frequently 
applied as an adjunct to determining operative candidacy, and with modifications to current 
algorithms, they could well serve a valuable role in assisting surgical teams in particular. 
However, even with modifications, such scores do not exist in a vacuum, and are but one data 
point when making nuanced decisions regarding ones’ ability to recover from a major surgery. 
In addition to the aforementioned difficulties, applying frailty scores to persons with disability 
would perpetuate structures of inequity. A person with a disability may have the same or better 
overall probability of survival as a person without a disability, although treatments such as 
ventilatory support and physical rehabilitation may need to continue for a relatively longer 
period of time or in greater intensity in order for the outcome to be achieved. Equality would 
stipulate that everyone be given the same chance whereas equity would recognize that some 
classes of patients, such as those with disability, would need more treatment in terms of intensity 
or duration in order for the same outcome to be achieved. Invoking equality rather than equity in 
triage decisions based on frailty scores would disproportionately harm persons with a disability 
and thus be unjust. 
IV. The Complicated Relationship of Frailty Scores and Disability Discrimination 
Clearly, understanding the drivers and conditions of discrimination on the basis of disability 
is extremely complex. Researchers interested in doing so should look to and draw upon resources 
in philosophy of disability as well as disability studies, and engage with the lived experience of 
people with disability more broadly. A more nuanced and sophisticated conceptual architecture 
concerning disability is needed, especially in relationship to clinical practice. Because of the 
conceptual complexity of disability as well as the conceptual ambiguity at play in concepts such 
as “frailty” and “vulnerability,” we remain unconvinced by Wilkinson’s arguments that current 
algorithms for frailty scoring can be utilized in triage—and applied beyond triage—in a way that 
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